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BENCH MEMO 
No, 70-87 OT 1971 
Police Department of the City of Chicago y. Mosley 
Certiorari to CA 7 (Hastings, Kiley & Kerner) 
No. 70-5106 OT 1971 
Grayned y. City of Rockford 
Appeal from the Supreme Court of Illinois ( Ward, J.)(Schaefer, J,, 
dissenting) 
Peaceful Picketing Cases. 
These two cases have been consolidated for oral argument, 
Controlling Cases, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940); Cox v. - -- -
Louisiana, 379 US 559 (1965); Amalgamated Food Employees Union y. 
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 US 308 (1968). 
• 
• 
In No. 70-87, Police Department y. Mosley, resp Mosley sought 
an injunction in the USDC for ND Illinois against the enforcement 
of a Chicago ordinance which prohibited picketing on a public 
~ ay within 150 feet of a public school building. The USDC granted 
petr's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. 
CA 7 reversed, holding the ordinance unconstitutional on its face 
for overbreadth. This Court granted certiorari at the instance 
r----_ 
of the Police Department of the City of Chicago. 
In No. 70-5106, Grayned y. City of Rockford, petr Grayned 
was convicted, after jury trial in the Circuit Court of Winnebago 
County, Illinois, of violating two Rockford ordinances, one of 
which prohibited picketing on a public way within 150 feet of a 
public school building, and one of which prohibited making or 
assisting in the making of any noise or diversion which tends 
or 
to disturb the peace fl1f good order of a school session, while on 
public or private grounds adjacent to a public school building. 
Petr Grayned was sentenced to a $25 tine for violating each . 
ordinance. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, over the 
dissent of Justice (now Chief Justice) Schaefer. This Court 
granted certiorari at the instance of lfMH:XlHjfilOiXIOQUOfUJHOOflff 
Grayned. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
(1) Whether an ordinance which prohibits picketing by a 
lone, peaceful picket on a public way within 150 feet of a public 
schooi while the school is in session, and\ hour before and after 
• the school session, is u~constitutional on its face? 
(2) Whether an ordinance which prohibits jHi¥JfHDI picketing 
on a public way 
/ within 150 feet of a public school while the school is in session, 





dispute, sets up a classification which works a denial of equal 
protection of the laws? 
(3) Whether an ordinance which prohibits "picketing or 
demonstrating" within 150 feet of a public school is unconstitu-
tionally vague? 
(4) Whether an ordinance which prohibits the willful making 
of "any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the 
peace or good order of@ school session or class" is uncoastitu-
tionally vague? 
STATUTES 
Municipal Code of Chicago, Section 193-l(i)a 
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly, 
i: '}( -;'( 
(i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 
150 feet of any primary or secondary school building 
while the school is in session and one-half hour before 
the school is in session and one-half hour after the 
school session has been concluded, provided that this 
subsection does not prohibit the peaceful picketing 
of any school involved in a labor dispute, 
Code of Ordinances of the City of Rockford, Section 18,11 
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly, 
~
* * * 
(i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 
150 feet of any primary or secondary school building while 
the school is in session and one-half hour before the 
school is in session and one-half hour after the school 
session has been concluded, provided that this sub-
section does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of any 





Code of Ordinances of the City of Rockford, Section 19.2(a) 
That no person, while on puQ._~ic ~ private grounds adja-
cent to any building in which a school or any class 
thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in 
the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or 
tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school 
session or class thereof. 
FACTS 
In No. 70-87, Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 
From early September, 1967 to April 4, 1968, resp Mosley, 
a federal postal employee, frequently walked upon the public 
sid$walk adjoining Jones Commercial High School in Chicago carrying 
a sign that read, "Jones High School practices black discrimination. 
Jones High School has a black quota." On April 5, 1968, the City 
of Chicago adopted the ordinance prohibiting picketing within 
150 feet of a public school. Resp, upon seeing a newspaper 
announcement of the ordinance, contacted the petr Chicago Police 
Department; upon inquiry he was advised that he would be arrested 
if he continued to picket the school. Resp commenced the instant 
action for an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance. 
Petr Chicago Police Department admitted that at all times resp's 
actions were peaceful and orderly, that he never tnterrupted 
the free flow of traffic to and from the school, and that they 
had no reason to believe that his activities would lead to acts 
which were not peaceful, orderly, and quiet • 
In No. 70-5106, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
On April, 25, 1969, a demonstration was held i n front of a .-
high school in the city of Rockford. Petr Grayned, along with 
~ 
40 others out of a c~ of approxim~ ely 200, was arrested. The 




sought addition of courses in Negro history, hiring of more 
Negro teachers, use of olack student cheer leaders; in addition, 
they protested discriminatory treatment of black students and 
lack of representation of black students in school organizations. 
Issues 
The major issues are the constitutionality of the ordinance 
prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school during school 
hours, and the constitutionality of the classifications set up 
as a result of exempting labor picketing (equal protection). CA 7 
held the ordinance 1mconstitutional .Q.!! its face; the Illinois 
Supreme Court held the ordinance constitutional on its face and ----
.2:.§. applied to the mass picketing involved in Grayned. 
The vagueness issue _ presented in Grayned is insubstantial 
as to "pickets or demonstrates'; but is a substantial question 
as to "any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb 
the peace or good order" of a school session or class. 
Content ions 
The parties approach the iiV)fYW)HHfYlf question of the constitu-
. 1 · ---f h / I b d h · "' · tiona ity o t e statute as an over rea t question, a question 
of the constitutionality of the statute on its face rather tjlan 
as applied to the conduct involved in each case. Rather than 
detail the contentions of the parties, which should be fairly 
clear by now, I will deal with those contentions when discussing 
• the issues. Rather than treat the cases separately in all instances 
of the following discussion, I will refer to them as "the citizens" 






The starting point for considering the constitutionality of 
the statute is Thornhill y. Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940). The Court 
in Thornhill considered an Alabama state statute which made it 
unlawful for any person to "picket" a place of business for the 
purpose of injuring its lawful business "without just cause or 
legal excuse." Noting that the statute would "prohibit a single 
individual from walking slowly and peacefully back and forth 
on the public sidewalk in front of the premises of an employer, 
~ without speaking to anyone, carrying a sign or placard," 
the Court declared the statute unconstitutional on its face. 
The statute was held unconstitutional because its scope was too 
broad (overbreadth), in that it prohibited conduct that was consti-
tutionally ~ protected. That protected conduct was the peaceful 
~ 
picketing, the free expression of views on a matter of public 
concern. 
~
Since the scope of the statute prohibited~ expression 
that would not occ.asion imminent and aggravated danger to community -- ' 
interests, it intruded into an area of constitutionally protected 
expression beyond governmental regulation, and was therefore 
held unconst itutional on its face • . 
Since picketing does contain elements other than "pure speech," 
it can be the subject of governmental regulation. Hughes y 4 
I 
Superior Court, 339 US 460 (1950). There is no doubt that the 
time, place, and manner of picketing can be the subject of 
~ p~ e regulations. In Cox y. Louisiana, 379 US~ (1965), 
for example, this Court QHOKXJf~IOf~ dealt 
with a Louisiana statute which provided, 
·7 
I 
Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, 
or impeding the administration of justice, or with the 





court officer, in the discharge of his duty pickets 
or parades in or near a building housing a court of 
the State of Louisiana ••• shall be fined ••• or 
imprisoned •••• 
The Court characterized the statute as "narrowly drawn to punish 
specific conduct that infringes a substantial state interest in 
protecting the judicial process," and held it constitutional 
on its face (although convictions for violating the statute were 
reversed). · The Cox statute differs fr.om the instant statute in 
that it is more narrowly drawn, prohibiting only the kinds of 
picketing (picketing with intent to obstruct justice) directly 
related to the state interest which the statute sought to protect. 
Since picketing involves protected exercise of first amendment 
rights, as this Court noted in Food Employees .Y:• J9gin Valley 
Plaza, Inc,, 391 US 308, 313 (1968): 
We start from the premise that peaceful picketing 
carried on in a location open generally to the 
public is, absent other factors involving the purpose 
or manner of the picketing, protected by the First 
Amendment, 
any restriction on picketing, statutory or otherwise, must be 
legitimate 
narrowly drawn, so as not to infringe lflt the/exercise of 1st 
'-
amendment rights while protecting the state interest sought to be 
protected. This case is not a Logan Valley case, however, because 
use of public ways rather than private property is involved. As 
the Court noted in Logan Valley, "streets, sidewalks, parks, and 
other similar public places are so historically associated with 
the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for the 
purpose of exercising such rights cannot Wfflftf~ constitutionally 
be denied broadly and absolutely." 391 US at 315. See also Hague 
.Y:• CIO, 307 US 495, 515-16 (1939). 
The governments take the position that Thornhill has been 
7 
substantially eroded over time. It has not. Thornhill recognized 
• that picketing could be prohibited or regulated in certain instances, 
and subsequent cases have merely defined the circumstances under 
which restriction is permissible. The Court has held that picketing 
which has an unlawful purpose can be prohibited, that picketing in 
the context of serious violence can be prohibited if the picketing . 
in the past generated the violence, that mass picketing which 
unreasonably interferes with free ingress and egress to or from 
buildings, or which unreasonably obstructs use of the streets or 
sidewalks, can be prohibited, etc. See, ~.g., Int'l Brotherhood 
y_, Vogt, Inc., 354 US 284 (1957); Milk Wagon Drivers Union y_. 
Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 US 287 (1941); Cameron y_. Johnson, 390 US 
611 (1968). 
~ 




m~ narrowly drawn to deal ~ with abuses of picketing. -Injunctione are different because they are tailored to a factual 
situation; thus precedents in the injunction area are not really 
relevant to problems of overbreadth. 
The governments justify the ordinance on the ground that it 
creates a reasonable buffer zone around the schools, one that .. ~ 
• 
prevents violence and distractions, yet permits those inside the 
buffer zone to be aware of the picketing (this latter point seems 
\ . 
/ to XO unaercut the first two points). They contend that the 
\ ordinances ~e narro~ly limited, being limited both in time and 
\ n place. Chicago , however, makes one argument that strikes me 
as being a damaging admission from their standpoint. Chicago 
states that the ordinance is directed toward the recent "widespread 
disorders at schools." If that is indeed what the ordinance is 
designed to prevent, then it could surely be accomplished by 
means less drastic than the instant ordinance, whose scope is so 
• 
• 
broad as to prevent picketing by a solitary picket who, the Chicago 
Police Department concedes, posed no danger of foreseeable disorderly 
consequences. Examples of more narrowly drawn ordinances are 
ordinances which prohibit picketing with intent to disrug:the 
opeartion of the publice schools (like the ordinance upheld in 
Cox), ordinances which prohibit~ picketing in the immediate 
vicinity of public schools, ordinances that require a certain 
distance between pickets so as to effectively limit the size of 
crowds around public buildings, ordinances which permit the local 
governing body to prohibit picketing around public schools when it 
determines that such picketing would create a threat of imminent 
violence, etc., etc, In other words, the City of Chicago can deal 
with the substantive problem of "widespread disorders at schools" 
in a variety of ways which will not impinge on Mosley's exercise 
of his first amendment rights on the public ways. To the extent 
that there is only an apprehension of possible disturbances, and 
the ordinance is regarded as a prophylactic measure, this Court 
stated in Tinker y. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 
393 US 503, 508 (1969), that "in our system, undifferentiated ·1 
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome 
the right to freedom of expression." 
On the equal protection issue, the governments argue that 
exemption of picketing when the school is involved in a labor 
dispute was necessary because federal law has pre-empted the area 
of labor relations, This is frivolous, because the National Labor 
Relations Act exemptes states and their political subdivisions 
• from the definition of "employer~ The ~ governments 
argue that the classification should be upheld because it is not 
"arbitrary;" in other words, they argue that the Court should apply 
7· 
the "reasonableness" rather than the "compelling state interest" 
standard of equal protection review. However , where fundamental 
• rights are involved, such as the 1st amendment right1 involved 
here, the Court has geherally applied the stricter standard of 
review. This would seem particularly appropriate here, for the 
state is effectively~ differentiating between subjects which 
may and may not be discussed on the public streets. Insofar 
• 
as there being a compelling BU state interest behind the distinc-
tion, I see none. In fact, ~trikes by public employees are 
> 
against the law in Illinois. This being the case, it does not --even seem "reasonable" to allow MX an exception for labor pickets 
,~·· -
who are, if on strike, engaging in unlawful conduct. And, indeed, --
as the citizens note, if tranquility in the schools is the object 
of the statute, it is difficult to understand why labor picketing 
might be less harmful from that standpoint than "private" picketing. 
On the vagueness issue, I see nothing unconstitutionally 
vague about "pickets or demonstdtes." The phrase "any noise 
/0 
or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good 
order of such school session or class" does, however, lack specificity. 
To be unconstitutionally vague, however, a statute or statutory 
• 
phrase must be more than somewhat unspecific. It must either 
fail to provide a comprehensible normative standard of behavior, 
or lend itself to such a degree of on-the-spot administrative 
interpretation as to allow the enforcement au~orities to pick 
and choose among expressions of view that will be permitted on 
the streets. See Cox y. Louisiana, 379 US 559, 568-69; Coates y. 
Cincinnati, 402 US 611, 613-14 (1971). While the statute c9uld 
well be held void-for-vagueness on its face, there is the problem 




in front of the school - this is Grayned only) may be within the 
range of acts constitutionally subject to proscription and clearly 
forbidden by the ordinance, In other words, the statute (ordinance) 
may be vague l!.§ applied to certain acts, but would~ be vague 
l!.§ applied to the demonstration in question. Statutes regulating 
speech are often subjected to vagueness analysis "on their faces," 
while statutes regulating conduct are often subject to vagueness 
analysis "as applied." Since elements of speech are involved in 
the picketing, and the ordinance by its terms can clearly reach 
speech and picketing, this may be an appropriate case for facial 
analysis • 
Conclusiona Especially on the overbreadth and vagueness issues, 
I find this a very close case. The equal protection arguments 
advanced on behalf of the governments appear singularly weak to 
me, On balance, I think that I am inclined toward the citizens 
on the overbreadth. issue as well.' There is no real problem with 
choosing between "overbroad on its face" and "overbroad as applied" 
approaches to proper 1st amendment analysis in Mosley, because the 
picketing involved the'tf is protected picketing in its most 
• 
pristine form - a solitary, peaceful picket, on a public way. In 
other words, if the lesser standard of "overbroad as applied" 
' 
were adopted, Mr. Mosley would surely be in the category of those 
• 
as to whom the ordinance is "overbroad as applied," if anyone is 
in the category, ~ Otherwise stated, if the ordinance is 
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Voted on .... . .. . .. . ... . ... , 19 .. . 
Assigned . . .... . ........... , 19 . . . 
Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
70-87 
No. 70-5106 
-t- .1. r;, POLICE DEPARTMENT OF CHICAGO v. MOSLEY 
HOLD 
FOR 
Rehnquist, J ... . ......... , . ... . 
Powell, J . . .. . .. . ........ , .... . 
Blackmun, J . ... . ........ , .... . 
Marshall, J . ............. , .... . 
White, J ................ . , .... . 
Stewart, J . ...... . ....... , .... . 
Brennan, J .. ............. , .... . 
Douglas, J . . .............. , .... . 
Burger, Ch. J . ........... , . ... . 
vs. 
GRAYNED v. ROCKFORD 
I /z~ /72-
JURISDICTIONAL I NOT 
CERT. STATEMENT MERITS MOTION AB- VOT-
--.,---+---.--~--,----+--,---t-----,---1sENT 
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D ING 
-
;%u.p-rtlttC (qoitrt of Ure 'Jlliiitch' ~ tafrs 
~ ct1rlri1tgton, Il). QJ. 20ffe>~~ 
CHAM B ERS OF" 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
May 24, 1972 
7 0-87, Police Dept. v. Mosley 
Dear Thurgood, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 







MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
Res No. 70-87, Police Department of the City of Chicago y. 
Mosley 
This case involves the Chicago city ordinance which 
prohibits picketing within 150 feet of a school building 
during school hours, but exempts "peaceful picketing of 
any school involved in a labor dispute.'.' 
You voted to affirm CA 7, striking the statute down 
on equal protection grounds. Marshall's opinion for 
the Court does precisely this. You noted that the exemption 
for labor picketing is "irrational." 
JOIN MARSHALL CEP 
-
~up:tmtt ~curl cf tltt 'J!foitt b ~ tntta 
J}'l:ttllfittg!c-n. !0. <!}. 20,?J!.,;l 
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. May 25, 1972 
RE: No. 70-87 - Police Department of the · 
City of Chicago, et al. v. Mosley 
Dear Thurgood: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
s~ 
-
~n,µri-mt ~ttittt cf tlre Jfai.te~ ~tates 
:µ1&$Jrhtsttttt. p. QJ. 211.;;>1,.;t 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS May 25 , 1972 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your opinion in 
No . 70- 87 - Police Dept . v. 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
cc: Conference 
- May 25, 1972 
Re: No. 70-87 Police Department of the City 
of Chica~ v. Mosley 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your opinion of the Court. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
-
.§u.pt-i•1ttt <!Jo-urt c-f flrc ~mu~ .§tau!' 
'JTMfyittgfott, ~- {!J. 2!lffeJl,~ 
CHAMBER S OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 5, 1972 
Re: No. 70-87 - Police Department 
of the City of Chicago v. 
Mosley 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to Conference 
\ 
\ 
;$u:p-r-tntt <!}cu:rt ttf tlr t 1tttitt?t .;§;taftg 
,rlllllrmgi:tttt. ~- <!}. 2llffeJ}.;l 
• CHAMBERS OF 
• ..JSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
June 6, 1972 
Re: No. 70-87 - Police Department of Chicago 
v. Mosley 
Dear Thurgood: 
I have withheld my vote in this case because 
I wanted to see what was forthcoming in the companion 
case, No. 70-5106 - Grayned v. City of Rockford. I 
have assumed that you intend to bring both opinions 
down together . If this assumption is incorrect, please 




Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
.:§u:.p-rimt {Q:tturt ttf t4t ~ttifrh ~tirug 
JTi<~Jri1tgi:ott. l9. {Q:. 2llffe.}}$ 
C H AMBERS OF 
~STICE W ILLIAM H . R E HN Q UIS T 
June 6, 1972 
Re: No. 70-87 - Chicago v. Mo s l e y 
Dear Thurgood: 
Your opinion has convinced me that even under my view 
of the equal protec t ion clause, there is no basis for the 
labor union exception to this picketing ordinance. Since I 
can't join in some of the broader statements in your opinion, 
will you show me as concurring in the result. 
Sincerely, / 
!fa('}~/ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 





MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
Re: No. 70-5106, Grayned y. City of Rockford 
This is the companion case to No. 70-87, Police Depart-
ment of the City of Chicago y. Mosley. The case is being 
treated separately because, in addition to a conviction for 
violating a constitutionally infirm-.f statute prohibiting 
picketing within 150 feet of a school but exempting labor 
picketing, it involves a conviction for violating an 
anti-noise statute. Marshall has circulated an opinion 
for the Court, c}{firming the conviction.. for violating the 
anti-noise statute. won has c ircu .. 
--- ~ __,.. /\ 
lated a dissent. 
Appellant challenged the anti-noise statute only on 
its f~e -- not as applied to him. This challenge was 
- ------------two - pronged; appellant contended that the statute was un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad. Marshall's opinion 
rejects both of these arguments. WOD dissents on the ground 
that there was no evidence that appellant made any noise; 
this issue is not before the Court since appellant only 
challenged the statute on its face. 
The opinion is by far too long, but seems correct. 
You voted to~firm 




~ftlU ~omt at t4, 1tniut ... 
•utrm¢on. ~- <!}. 2D.;i"~ 
CHAMISERS 0" 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 13, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5106 - Graymied v. City 
of Rockford 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~~ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to Conference 
- ;§1tµrtme <Cl1urt of tqt 1lnittb §tatte 'lllas ~in ~,fon. ;ID. <i;. 20,5>1,;3 
CHArv'SERS or 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
June 13, 1972 
70-5106 - Grayned v. Rockford 
Dear Thurgood, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 






_§nvunu <!Jourt llf tir~ ~mu~ ;ifateg 
J\l:udp:n:¢~ ~. <!J. 2llffe~$ 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 13, 1972 
Re: No . 70-87 - Police Department of Chicago 
v. Mosley_ 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me with Bill Rehnquist as con-




Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
- June 14, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5106 Grayned v. City of Rockford 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice \.farshall 




.®nputttt (qo-u:rt af tlrc 'Jlfui:tch ~tmcs 
._Mfri:ttgtcn:. gl. (q. 2llffel1~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 14, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5106 - Grayned v. City of Rockford 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, / 
~.;J 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
- ,jnprtmt (qou:rt af tltt ~trittb ,jttttts-'Jif ag!71ttgtan, Jf}. QJ. 20.;i't2 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR. 
June 14, 1972 
RE: No. 70-5106 - Grayned v. City of Rockford 
Dear Thurgood: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
/41 
- CHAMBERS OF 
~~t tttt QJomt of tltt 'Jll1tittll- ;im.tt£f 
~asfp:n.gtfut . JD . QJ. 2.ll.;i)!.~ 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
June 14, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5106 - Grayned v. City of Rockford 
Dear Thurgood: 
Will you please not at the end of your opinion 
something along the following lines: 
11Mr. Justice Blackmun joins in the 
judgment and in Part I of the opinion of 
the Court. He concurs in the result as 
to Part II of the opinion. 11 
With the half victory for the appellant, I suppose 
we shall be confronted with a question of costs. I do not 
know whether we should consider this now, so that it will 
not be delayed over the summer. In any event, I shall be 
guided by your recommendation as to this. 
Sincerely, 
j{;. . !1 . 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§u:pumt <!fqu.rt qf flrt 'Jnnitt h .:§mftg 
'JJJ~g!yinghm. ~. ~ 20ffeJ!.~ 
June 15, 1972 
No. 70-5106 -- Grayned v. City of Rockford 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in the above case. I have 
an impression that I have previously joined you, but 
I cannot put my finger to the carbon. In any event, 
let this fill any deficiencies. 
Regards, 
"? 0 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to Conference 
-
THE C. J. W. 0. D . W. J.B. P. S. B. R. W. T . M. H. A. B. L. F . P . W. H. R. 
. 1/25/72 
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Appellant Richard Grayned was convicted for his part 
in a demonstration in front of West Senior High School 
in Rockford, Illinois. Negro students at the school had 
presented their grievances to school administrators, who 
then gave an unsatisfactory response. At that point, 
a more public demonstration of protest was planned. 
On April 25, 1969, approximately 200 people-stu-
dents, their family members, and friends- gathered 
next to the school grounds. Appellant, whose brother 
and twin sisters were attending the school, was part of 
this group. The demonstrators marched around on a 
sidewalk about 100 feet from the school building, which 
was set back from the street. Many carried signs which 
summarized the grievances : "Black cheerleaders to cheer 
too"; "Black history with black teachers"; "Equal rights, 
Negro counselors." Others, without placards, made the 
"power to the people" sign with their upraised and 
clenched fists. 
In other respects, the evidence at appellant 's trial 
was sharply contradictory. Go".:ernment witnesses re-
ported that the demonstrators repeatedly cheered, · 
chanted, baited policemen, and made other noise that 
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were distracted from their school activities and lined 
the classroom windows to watch the demonstra.tion; that 
some demonstrators successfully yelled to their friends 
to leave the school building and join the demonstration; 
that uncontrolled latenesi;;es after period changes in the 
school were far greater than usual, with late students 
admitting that they had been watching the demonstra-
tion; and that, in genera.I, orderly school procedure was 
disrupted. Defense witnesses claimed that the dem-
onstrators were at all times quiet and orderly; that 
they did not seek to violate the law, but only to "make 
a point"; that the only noii;;e was made by policemen 
using loudspeakers; that almost no students were notice-
able at the schoolhouse windows; and that orderly school 
procedure was not disrupted. 
After warning the demonstrators, the police arrested 
40 of them, including appellant.1 For participating in 
the demonstration, Grayned ·was tried and convicted of 
violating two Rockford ordinances, hereinafter referred 
to as the "anti-picketing" ordinance aJ1d the "anti-noise" 
ordinance. A $25 fine was imposed for each violation .. 
Since Grayned challenged the constitutionality of each 
ordinance, he appealed directly to the Supreme Court of 
Illinois. He claimed that the ordinances were invalid 
on their face, but did not urge that, as applied to him, 
the ordinances had punished constitutionally protected 
activity. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that both 
ordinances were constitutional on their face. 46 Ill. 2d 
1 Police officers testified that "there was no way of picking out 
any one in particular" while making arrests. Record, p. 66. How-
ever, apparently only males were arrested. Record , p. 65, 135, 147. 
Since appellant's sole claim in this appeal is that he was convicted 
under facially unconstitutional ordinances, there is no occasion for 
us to eYaluate either the propriety of these selective arrests or the 
sufficiency of evidence that appellant himself actually engaged in 
conduct within the terms of the ordinances. 
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486. (1970). Grayned appealed to us, repeating his 
challenge to the facial constitutionality of both ordi-
nances. We noted probable jurisdiction, 404 U. S. 820 
(1971). We conclude that the "anti-picketing" ordi-
nance is unconstitutional, but affirm the court below 
with respect to the "anti-noise" ordinance. 
I 
At the time of appellant's arrest and conviction, Rock-
fonl's antipicketing ordinance provided that 
"A person commits disorderly conduct when he 
knowingly: 
"(i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way 
within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school 
building while the school is in session and one-half 
hour before the school is in session and one-half 
hour after the school session has been concluded, 
provided that this this subsection does not prohibit 
the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a 
labor dispute . .. . " Code of Ordinances, c. 28, 
§ 18.1 (i). 
With the exception of a single unimportant word, this 
ordinance is identical to the Chicago disorderly conduct 
ordinance we have today considered in Conl-isk v. Mosley, 
an te. For the reasons given in Mosley, we agree with 
the dissenting Judge Schaefer below, and hold that 
§ 18 (i) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Appellant's conviction under 
this invalid ordinance must be reversed. 2 
2 In November 1971, the anti-picketing ordinance was amended to 
delete the bbor picketing proviso. As Rockford notes, "This amend-
ment and deletion had, of course, no effect on Appellant's personal 
situation." Brief, p. 2. Necessarily, we must consider the facial 
constitutionality of the ordinance in effect when appellant was ar-
rested and convicted. 
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II 
The antinoise ordinance reads, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
"[N]o person, while on public or private grounds 
adjacent to any building in which a, school or any 
class thereof is in session, shall wilfully make or 
assist in making a noise or diversion which disturbs 
or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such 
school session or class thereof .... " Code of Or-
dinances, c. 28, § 19.2 (a). 
Appellant claims that, on its face, this ordinance is both 11 
vague and overbroad, and therefore unconstitutional 
We conclude, however, that the ordinance suffers from 
neither of these related infirmities. 
A. Vagueness 
It is a basic principle of due process that an enact-
ment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not 
clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important 
values. First, because we assume that man is free to 
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist 
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so 
that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the 
innocent by not providing fair warning. 3 Second, if 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be pre-
vented, laws must provide explicit standards for those 
3 E. g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 
(1972); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278, 287 
(1961) ; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,617 (1954) ; Jordan 
v. De Geo.rge, 341 U. S. 223, 230-232 (1951); Lanzetta v. New 
Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Construction 
Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 
255 U. S. 81 (1921); International Harvester Co. v. K entucky, 234 
U. S. 219 (1914). 
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who apply them.4 A vague law impermissibly delegates 
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory appli-
cation." Third, but related, where a vague statute 
"abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment 
freedoms," <; it "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] 
freedoms." 7 Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citi-
zens to " 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' ... than 
if the boundaries of the forbidden a.reas were clearly 
marked." 8 
Although the question is close, we conclude that the 
"anti-noise" ordinance is not impermissibly vague. The-
court below rejected appellant's argwnents "that pro-
4 E. g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, supra; Coates v. 
Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611 (1971); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 
111, 120 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); Ashton v. K entucky, 384 
U.S. 195, 200 (1966); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, 90-91 (1965) ; Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 
(1951); Saia v. New Yorlc, 334 U. S. 558, 559-560 (1948); Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S .. 
444 (1938); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 261-264 (1937). 
5 At least where First Amendment interests are affected, a precise 
statute "evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific con-
duct be ... proscribed," Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 
236 (1963), assures us that the legislature has focussed on the First 
Amendment interests and determined that other governmental pol--
icies compel regulation. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public 
Forum, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 32; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157,. 
200, 202 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
6 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964). 
1 Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278,287 (1961). 
8 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372, 372 (1964), quoting Speiser 
v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526. See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 
195, 200-201 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 486 
(1965); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-152 (1959). Winters 
v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948); Stromberg v. California, 283-
U.S. 359, 369 (1931) . 
6 
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scribed conduct was not sufficiently specified and that 
police were given too broad a discretion in determining 
whether conduct was proscribed." 46 Ill. 2d 492, 494 
(1970). Although it referred to other, similar statutes 
it had recently construed and upheld, the court below 
djd not elaborate on the meaning of the "anti-noise" 
ordinance.9 In this situation, as Justice Frankfurter put 
it, we must "extrapolate its allowable meaning." 10 Here, 
we are "relegated to the words of the ordinance itself," 11 
to the interpretations the court below has given to 
analagous statutes,12 and, perhaps to some degree, to. 
the interpretation .of the statute given by those charged 
with enforcing it.1 3 Extrapolation, of course, a deli-
cate task, for it is not within our power to construe 
and narrow state laws.14 
With that warning, we find no unconstitutional vague-· 
ness in the antinoise ordinance. Condemned to the 
use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty 
from our language.1 5 The words of the Rockford ordi-
nance are marked by "flexibility and reasonable breadth, 
rather than meticulous specificity," Esteban v. Central 
Missouri State College, 415 F . 2d 1077, 1088 (CA8 1969) 
9 The trial magistrate simp]~, charged the jury in the words of the· 
ordinance. The complaint and verdict form used slightly different 
language. See n . 24, infra. 
1 n Garner v. Louisiana, 3G8 U. S. 157, 174 (1961) (concurring 
opinion). 
n Ceates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 614 (1971). 
1 2 E. g., Gooding v. Wilson, - U. S. - (1972). 
13 E. g., Lake Carriers Association v. MacMillian, - U. S. -, 
- (1972); Cole v. Richardson, - U. S. - (1972): Ehlert v. 
United States, 402 U. S. 99, 195 (1971); cf. Poe v. Ullmcm, 367 
u. s. 497 (1961). 
14 United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971). 
15 It will always be true that the fertile legal "imagination can con-
jure up hypothetical cases in which the meaning of [ disputed] terms 
will be a nice question." American Communications Association v. 
Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 412 (1950). 
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( BLACKMU N , J.) , cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965 ( 1970), 
but we think it is clear what the ordinance as a whole 
prohibits. Designed, according to its preamble, "for the 
protection of Schools," the ordinance forbids deliberately 
noisy or diversionary i G activity which disrupts or is 
about to disrupt normal school activities. It forbids 
this willful activity at fixed times-when school is in 
session-and at a sufficiently fixed place-"a.djacent" to 
the school. 11 Were we left with just the words of the 
ordinance, we might be troubled by the imprecision of 
the phrase "tends to disturb." 18 However, in Chicago 
v. M eyer, 44 Ill. 1, 4 (1969) , and Chicago v. Gregory, 
39 Ill. 2d 4 7 ( 1968), reversed on other grounds, 394 
U. S. 111 (1969) , the Supreme Court of Illinois con-
strued a Chicago ordinance prohibiting, in ter alia, a 
"diversion tending to disturb the peace," and held that 
it permitted conviction only where there was "imminent 
threat of violence." (Emphasis supplied.) See Greg-
ory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 116-117, 121-122 (1969) 
(Black, J. , concurring) .19 Since M eyer was specifically 
cited in the opinion below, and it in turn drew heavily 
on Gregory, we think it proper to conclude that the Su-
16 "Diversion" is defined by Webster 's Third New International 
Dictionary as "the act or an instance of di1·erting from one course [or 
use] to another . . . : the act or an instance of divert ing (as the 
mind or attention) from some activity or concern . .. : a turning 
aside .. . : something that turns the mind from serious concerns or 
ordinary matters and relaxes or amuses." 
17 Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 568-569 (1965) ("near" 
the courthouse not impermissibly vague). 
18 See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 119-120 (Black, J ., con-
curring); Gooding v. Wilson, - U. S., - , - (1972); Craig v. 
Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947); cf. Chaplinsky v. N ew Hampshire, 
315 U. S. 568 (1942) (statute punishing "fighting words," which 
have a "direct tendency to cause acts of violence," upheld); Street 
v. N ew York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). 
10 Cf. T erminiello v. Chicago, 400 Ill. 23 (1948) , reversed on other 
grounds, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) . 
8 
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preme Court of Illinois would interpret the Rockford 
ordinance to prohibit only actual or imminent inter-
ference with the "peace or good order" of the school. 
Although the prohibited quantum of disturbance is 
not specified in the ordinance, it is apparent from the 
statute's announced purpose that the measure is whether 
normal school activity has been or is about to be 
disrupted. We do not have here a vague, general "breach 
of the peace" ordinance, but a specific statute for the 
school context, where the prohibited disturbances are 
easily measured by their impact on the normal activi-
ties of the school. Given this "particular context," the 
ordinance gives "fair notice to ·whom [it ] is directed." 21 
Although the Rockford ordinance may not be as precise 
as the statu,te we upheld in Cameron v. John son, 390 
U. S. 611 (1968)-which prohibited picketing "in such 
a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with 
free ingress or egress to and from" any courthouse-
we think that, as in Canieron, the ordina,nce here clearly 
20 Some intermediat e appellate courts in Illinois appea r to have 
interpreted the phrase "tending to" out of the Chicago ordinance 
ent irely, at least in some contexts. Chicago v. Hansen, 86 N . E. 2d 
415, 337 Ill. App. 663 (1949) ; Chicago v. Holmes, 88 N. E. 2d 744, 
339 Ill. App. 146 (1949); Chicago v. N esbitt, 153 N. E. 259, 19 Ill. 
App . 2d 220 (1958 ) ; but cf. Chicago v. Williams, 195 N. E. 2d 425 
(1963) . 
In its brief, the city of Rockford indicat es that its sole concern 
is with actual disru ption. " [A] court and jury [is] charged with 
the duty of determining whether .. . a school has been disrupted 
and that the defendant's conduct, no matt er what it was, caused or 
cont ributed to cause the disruption." Appellee's Brief, p. 16. This 
was the theory on which the city tried appellant's case to the jury. 
Record pp. 12-13, although the jury was instruct ed in the words 
of t he ordinance. As already noted, supra, n. 1, no challenge is 
made here to the Rockford ordinance as applied in this case. 
21 Ame1'ican Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 
412 (1950) . 
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"delineates its reach in words of common understand-
ing." Id., at 616. 
Cox v. Louu;iana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965), and Coates-
v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611 (1971), on which appellant 
particularly relies, presented completely different sit.ua-
tions. In Cox, a general breach of the peace ordinance 
had been construed by state courts to mean "to agitater 
to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to inter-
rupt, to hinder, to disquiet." The Court correctly con-
cluded that, as construed, the ordinance permitted per-
sons to be punished for merely expressing unpopular 
views. 22 In Coates, the ordinance punished the sidewalk 
assembly of three or more persons who "conduct them-
selves in a manner annoying to persons passing by ... _,,. 
We held, in part, that the ordinance was impermissibly 
vague because enforcement depended on the completely 
subjective standard of "annoyance." 
Rockford 's anti-noise ordinance contains no broad in--
vitation to subjective or discriminatory enforcement. 
Rockford does not claim the broad power to punish all 
"noises" and "diversions." 23 The vagueness of these· 
terms, by themselves, is dispelled by the ordinance's re-
quirements that ( 1) the "noise or diversion" be actually 
incompatible with normal school activity; (2) there be 
a demonstrated causality between that disruption and 
22 Cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). Similarly, in numerous 
other cases, we have condemned broadly worded licensing ordinances 
which grant such standardless discretion to public officials that they 
are free to censor ideas and enforce their own personal preferences. 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147 (1969); Staub v. City 
Baxley, 355 U. S. 313 (1958) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 
(1948); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163-164 (1939); Lovell 
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
23 Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 546-550 (1965); Edwards· 
v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 223 ( 1963) . 
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the "noise or diversion"; and (3) the acts be "wilfully" 
done.21 "Undesirables" or their annoying" conduct may 
not be punjshed. The ordinance does not permit people 
to "stand on a public sidewalk ... only at the whim of 
any police officer." 25 The ordinance does not permit 
punishment for the expression of an unpopular point 
of view. Rather, there must be demonstrated interfer-
ence with school activities. As always, enforcement re-
quires the exercise of some degree of police judgment, 
but, as confined, that degree of judgment here is per-
missible. The Rockford City Council has made the basic 
policy choices, a.nd has given fair warnjng as to what 
is prohibited. "[T] he ordinance defines boundaries 
sufficiently distinct" for citizens, policemen, juries, and 
appellate judges.2 a It is not impermissibly vague. 
B. Overbreadth 
A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be 
"overbroad" if in its reach it prohibits constitutionaJly 
protected conduct. 21 Although appellaJ1t does not claim 
that, as applied to him, the anti-noise ordinance has pun-
ished protected expressive activity, he claims that the 
ordinance is overbroad on its face. Because overbroad 
laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases 
firmly establish appellant's standing to raise an over-
24 Tracking the complaint, the jury verdict found Grayned guilty 
of "Wilfully cnusing diversion of good order of public school in 
session, in that while on school grounds and while school was in 
session, did wilfully make and assist in the mnking of a diversion 
which tended to disturb the peace and good order of the school ses-
sion and class thereof." 
25 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, 90 ( 1965). 
26 Chicago v. Fort , 46 Ill. 2d 12, 16 (1970) , a case cited in the 
opinion below. 
27 See Zwicker v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-250 (1967) , and cases 
cited. 
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breadth challenge.28 The crucial question, then, is 
whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions 
what may not be punished under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. Specifically, a.ppellant contends 
that the Rockford ordinance unduly interferes with First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to picket on a pub-
lic sidewalk near a school. We disagree. 
"In considering the right of a municipality to control 
the use of public streets for the expression of religious 
[or political] views, we start with the words of Mr. Jus-
tice Roberts that 'Wherever the title of streets and 
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in 
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, 
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicat-
ing thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.' Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939)." 
Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 293 (1951). See 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969). 
The right to use a public place for expressive activity 
may be restricted only for weighty reasons. 
Clearly, government has no power to restrict such 
activity because of its message. 29 Our cases make equally 
clear, however, that reasonable "time, place and manner" 
regulations ma.y be necessary to further significant gov-
ermental interests, and are permitted.3° For example, 
28 E. g., Gooding v. Wilson, - U. S. - (1972); Coates v. Cin-
cinnati, 402 U.S. 611 , 616 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 
479. 486 (1965), and cases cited; K unz v. New York , 340 U.S. 290 
(1951) . 
20 Conlisk v. Mosley, ante, - U.S. - (1972) . 
3° Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 575-576 (1941) ; Kunz 
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-294 (1951) ; Poulos v. N ew Hamp-
shire, 345 U. S. 395, 398 (1953); Cox v. Louisiana. 379 U. S. 536, 
554-555 (1965) ; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965) ; Adderly 
v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 46-48 (1966) ; Food Employees v. Logan 
Valley, 391 U.S. 308, 320-321 (1968) ; Shuttlesworth v. Bi.rmingham, 
394 U.S. 147 (1969) . 
12 
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two parades cannot march on the same street simul-
taneously, and government may allow only one. Cox 
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). A dem-
onstration or parade on a large street during rush hour 
might put an intolerable burden on the essential flow 
of traffic, and could be prohibited. Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U. S. 536, 554 (1965). Overamplified loudspeakers 
might assault the citizenry, and government may turn 
them down. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949); 
Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558, 562 (1948). Subject 
to such reasonable regulation, however, peaceful dem-
onstrations in public places are protected by the First 
Amendment.31 Of course, where demonstrations turn 
violent, they lose their protected quality as expression 
under the First Amendment.32 
The nature of a place, "the pattern of its normal 
activities, dictates the kinds of regulations of time, place, 
and manner that are reasonable." 33 Although a silent 
vigil may not unduly interfere with a public library, 
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 (1966), making a 
speech in the reading room almost certainly would. 
That same speech should be perfectly appropriate in 
a park. The crucial question is whether the manner 
of expression is basically incompatible with the normal 
activity of a particular place at a particular time. Our 
cases make clear that in assessing the reasonableness 
of regulation, we must weigh heavily the fact that com-
31 Conlisk v. Mosley, ante, - U.S.-, - (1972), and cases 
cited. 
32 See Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 328- 345 
(1970). 
33 Wright , The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 
1042 (1969). Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Adderly 
v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966); Food Employees v. Logan Valley, 
391 U. S. 308 (1968); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 
U.S. 503 (1969). 
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munication is involved; 34 the regulation must be nar-
rowly tailored to further the State's legitimate interest.35 
"Access to [the streets, sidewalks, parks, and other sim-
ilar public places] for the purpose of exercising [First 
Amendment rights] cannot constitutionally be denied 
broadly .... " 36 Free expression "must not, in the guise 
of regulation, be abridged or denied." 37 
In light of these general principles, we do not think 
that Rockford's ordinance is an unconstitutional regu-
lation of activity around a school. Our touchstone is 
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503 
( 1969), in which we considered the question of how to-
accommodate First Amendment rights with the "special 
characteristics of the school environment." Id., at 507 .. 
Tinker held that the Des Moines School District could 
not punish students for wearing black armbands to 
school in protest of the Vietnam War. Recognizing that 
"wide exposure to . . . robust exchange of ideas" is an 
"important part of the educational process" and should 
be nurtured, id., at 512, we concluded that free expres-
sion could not be barred from the school campus. We-
made clear that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension 
is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of ex-
34 E. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Talley v. Cali-
fornia, 362 U. S. 60 (1960); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 
(1948) ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 574 (1941); Hague 
v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 516 (1939) . See generally, Kalven, The 
Concept of the Public Forum, The Supreme Court Review 1965. 
35 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307 (1940); D e Jonge 
v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364-365 (1937); Schneider v. State, 308 
U. S. 147, 164 (1939); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 562-564 
(1965). Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960); NAACP · 
v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963). 
36 Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 308, 315, 
(1968). 
37 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-516 (1939). 
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pression," id., at 508,38 and that particular expressive 
activity could not be prohibited because of a "mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular view," id., at 509. But 
we nowhere suggested that students, teachers, or anyone 
else has an absolute constitutional right to use all parts 
of a school building or its immediate environs for his 
unlimited expressive purposes. Expressive activity could 
certainly be restricted, but only if the forbidden con-
duct "materially disrupts classwork or involves substan-
tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Id., 
at 513. The wearing of armbands was protected in 
Tinker only because the students "neither interrupted 
school activities nor sought to intrude in the school 
affairs or the lives of others. They caused discussion 
outside of the classrooms, but no interference with work 
and no disorder." Id., at 514. Compare Burnside v. 
Byers, 363 F. 2d 744 (CA5 1966), and Butts v. Dallas 
Ind. School District, 436 F. 2d 728 (CA5 1971), with 
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 
F. 2d 749 (CA5 1966). 
Just as Tinker made clear that school property may 
not be declared off-limits for expressive activity by stu-
dents, we think it clear that the public sidewalk adjacent 
to school grounds may not be declared off-limits for-
expressive activity by members of the public. But in 
each case, expressive activity may be prohibited if it 
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial 
disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Tinker 
v. Des Moines School District, supra, 393 U. S., at 513.39-
38 Cf. Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 516 (1939). 
39 In Tinker itself we recognized that the principle of that case 
was not limited to expressive actiYity within the school building 
itself. Id., at 512 n. 6, 513-514. See Esteban v. Central Missouri 
State College, 415 F. 2d 1077 (CA8 1969) (BLACKMUN, J.), cert.. 
denied, 398 U. S. 965 (1970); Jones v. Board of R egents, 436 F. 2d 
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We would be ignoring rea.lity if we did not recognize 
that the public schools in a community are important 
institutions, and are often the focus of significant griev-
ances.40 "\Vithout interfering with normal school activi-
ties, daytime picketing and handbilling on public grounds 
near a school can effectively publicize those grievances 
to pedestrians, school visitors, and deliverymen, as well 
as to teachers, administrators, and students. Some pick-
eting to that end will be quiet and peaceful, and will 
in no way disturb the normal functioning of the school. 
For example, it would be highly unusual if the classic 
expressive gesture of the solitary picketer disrupts any-
thing related t-0 the school, at least on a public sidewalk 
open to pedestrians.•' On the other hand, schools could 
hardly tolerate boisterous demonstrators who drown out 
classroom conversation, make studying impossible, block 
entrances, incite children to leave the schoolhouse, or 
otherwise disrupt normal school activities.42 
Rockford's antinoise ordinance goes no further than 
Tinker says a municipality may go to prevent inter-
ference with its schools. It is narrowly tailored to fur-
ther Rockford's compelling interest in having an un-
disrupted school session conducive to the students' 
learning, and does not unnecessarily interfere with First 
Amendment rights. Far from having an imperrnissibly 
618 (CA9 1970); Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. 
Supp. 947 (S. C. 1967) cited in Tinker . 
4° Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102 (1940). It goes 
without saying that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of 
expression in appropriate phces abridged on the plea that it may be 
exercised in some other place ." Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 
163 (1939). 
41 Cf. Jones v. Board of R egents, 436 F. 2d 618 (CA9 1970) . 
42 See Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F . 2d 1077 
(CA8 1968) (BLACKM UN, J.), cert . denied. 398 U. S. 965 (1970); 
Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (SD W. Va ., 1968) , aff'd, 399-
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broad prophylactic ordinance,4° Rockford punishes only 
conduct which disrupts or is about to disrupt normal 
school activities. That decision is made, as it should 
be, on an individualized basis, given the particular fact 
situation. Peaceful picketing which does not interfere 
with the ordinary functioning of the school is permit-
ted, as it must be. And the ordinance gives no license 
to punish anyone because of what he is saying.44 
We recognize that the ordinance prohibits some picket-
ing which is neither violent nor physically obstructive. 
Noisy demonstrations which disrupt or are incompatible 
with normal school activities are obviously within the 
ordinance's reach. Such expressive conduct may be con-
stitutionally protected at other places or other times, 
cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965), but next to 
school, while classes are in session, it may be prohib-
ited.45 The antinoise ordinance imposes no such re-
striction on expression, before or after the school session, 
while the stude11t/ faculty "audience" enters and leaves 
the school. 
In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965), this Court 
indicated that, because of the special nature of the place,4 a 
43 Cf. Jones v. Board of Regents, 436 F. 2d 618 (CA9 1970); 
H a.mond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (S. C. 
1967). 
44 Cf. Scoville v. Board of Education, 425 F. 2d 10 (CA7), cert. 
denied, 400 U. S. 826 (1970); Dickey v. Alabama State Boa.rd of 
Education, 273 F. Supp. 613 (MD Ala. 1967) (cited in Tinker). 
45 Different considerations, of course, apply in different circum-
stances. For example, restrictions appropriate to a single building 
high school during class hours would be inappropriate in many open 
areas on a college campus, just as an assembly which is permitted 
outside a dormitory would be inappropriate in the middle of a math-
ematics class. 
46 Noting the need "to assure that the administration of justice at 
all stages is free from outside control and influence," we emphasized 
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persons could be constitutionally prohibited from picket-
ing "in or near" a courthouse "with the intent of 
interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the admin-
istration of justice. Likewise, in Cameron v. Johnson, 
390 U. S. 611 (1968), we upheld a statute prohibiting 
picketing "in such a manner as to obstruct or unreason-
ably interfere with free ingress or egress to or from 
any ... county ... courthouses." 47 As in those two 
cases, Rockford's modest restriction on some peaceful 
picketing represents a considered and specific legisla.tive 
judgment that some kinds of expressive activity should 
be restricted at a particular time and place in order· 
to protect the schools.48 Such a reasonable regulation 
is not inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Cf. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966) .49 
The anti-noise ordinance is not invalid on its face. 50 
The judgment is 
Affirmed in part, Reversed in parL 
that "a State may protect against the possibility of a conclusion by 
the public ... [that a] judge's action was in part a product of 
intimidation and did not flow only from the fair and orderly working 
of the judicial process." Id ., at 562, 565. 
47 Quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161, we noted that 
"such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to .. ~ 
distribute information or opinion." Id., at 617. 
48 Cf. Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 202-203 (1961) (Harlan, 
J ., concurring). 
49 In Adderly, the Court held that demonstrators could be barred 
from jailhouse grounds not ordinarily open to the public, at least 
where the demonstration obstructed the jail driveway and inter-
fered with the functioning of the jail. In Tinker we noted that "a 
school is not like a hospital or a jail enclosure." 393 U. S. 503, 512 
11. 6 (1969). 
50 It is possible, of course, that there will be unconstitutional appli-
cations; but that is not a matter which presently concerns us. See· 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, 91 (1965) . 
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MR. J usTICE DouGLAS, dissenting in part. 
While I join Part I of the Court's opinion, I would also 
reverse the appellant's conviction under the antinoise 
ordinance. 
The municipal ordinance on which this case turns is 
§ 19.2 (a) which provides in relevant part: 
"That no person, while on public or private grounds 
adjacent to any building in which a school or any 
class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or 
assist in the making of any noise or diversion ,vhich 
disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order 
of such school session or class thereof." 
Appellant was one of 200 people picketing a school 
and carrying signs promoting a Black cause-"Black 
cheerleaders, to cheer too," "Black history with black 
teachers," "We want our rights" and the like. Appellant, 
however, did not himself carry a picket sign. There was 
no evidence that he yelled or made any noise whatsoever. 
Indeed, the evidence reveals that appellant simply 
marched quietly and on one occasion raised his arm in 
the "power to the people" salute. 
The picketers were mostly students; but they included 
former students, parents of students, and concerned citi-
zens. They had made proposals to the school board on 
their demands and were turned down. Hence the picket-
ing. The picketing was mostly by black students who 
were counselled and advised by a faculty member of the 
2 
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school. The school contained 1,800 students. Those 
counselling the students advised they must be quiet, walk 
hand in hand, no whispering, no talking. 
Twenty-five policemen were stationed nearby. There 
was noise but most of it was produced by the police who 
used loudspeakers to explain the local ordinance and to 
announce that arrests might be made. The picketing 
did not stop and some 40 demonstrators, including ap-
pellant, were arrested. 
The picketing lasted 20 to 30 minutes and some stu-
dents went to the windows of the classrooms to observe 
it. It is not clear how many there were. The picketing 
was, however, orderly or as one officer testified "very 
orderly." There ,ms no violence. And appellant made 
no noise whatever. 
What Mr. Justice Roberts said in Hague v. C/O, 307 
U. S. 496, 515-516, has never been questioned: 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, 
they have immemorially been held in trust for the 
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions. Such use of the streets and public places has,. 
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, 
immunities, rights, and liberties of citi%ens. The 
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the 
streets and parks for communication of views on 
national questions may be regulated in the interest 
of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be 
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and 
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good 
order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, 
be abridged or denied." 
We held in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 544- 545,. 
that a State could not infringe a person's right of free 
. 
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speech and free assembly by convicting him under a "dis-
turbing the peace" ordinance where all that the students 
in that case did was to protest segregation and discrimina-
tion against Blacks by peaceably assembling and marching 
to the courthouse where they sang, prayed, and listened 
to a speech, but where there was no violence, no rioting, 
no boisterous conduct. 
The school where the present picketing occurred was 
the center of a racial conflict. Most of the picketers were 
indeed students in the school. The dispute doubtless 
disturbed the school; and the blaring of the loudspeakers 
of the police was certainly a "noise or diversion" in the 
meaning of the ordinance. But there was no evidence 
that appellant was noisy or boisterous or rowdy. He 
walked quietly and in an orderly manner. As I read 
this record the disruptive force loosened at this school 
was an issue dealing with race-an issue that is pre-
eminently one for solution by First Amendment means. 
That is all that was done here; and the entire picketing, 
including appellant's part in it, was done in the best 
First Amendment tradition. 
